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Redistributive effects of CAP liberalisation: from the sectoral level to the single 
farm 
Abstract. There is a growing public and political interest in effects of agricultural policy on income 
distribution in the agricultural sector. Most of the literature regarding redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy is ex-post and static in nature and many tools for an ex-ante analysis of impacts of 
sectoral or macroeconomic policies depict farm groups or representative farms rather than individual 
farms. However, the measurement of inequality is highly sensitive to the aggregation of individual data. 
In this paper, redistributive effects of an abolishment of different instruments of the European Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) are analysed with a tool that is able to consistently assess impacts of sectoral 
policy on individual farm incomes. We find that an abolishment of the main components of the CAP, 
direct payments and market and price policies, results in a more unequal income distribution in relative 
terms, but a more equal income distribution in absolute terms. Based on the latter, we conclude that if the 
CAP aims at a more equal income distribution within the agricultural sector, then significant scope for 
improving the design of respective policy instruments exists. 
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades of reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) 
were characterized by replacing classical market price support measures by direct payments. Moreddu 
(2011) argues that due to this shift, agricultural support has become more visible and consequently, the 
distribution of support among farmers has gained more public attention. Fittingly, the European 
Commission (2012, p.8) states in its annual “Report on the distribution of direct aid to farmers” that 
“direct payments have lost their compensatory character over time and have increasingly become a 
support ensuring a certain farm income stability”. Increasing public interest in the distribution of 
agricultural support and the question ‘who gets what’ is reflected by general media coverage (e.g. The 
New Statesman, 2012) and in the specialized press (e.g. Agra-Europe, 2013, p.3). Thus, equity issues in 
the agricultural sector increasingly become an area of political concern, even on a national or sub-national 
basis. The European Commission (2012, p.8) e.g. claims that “the proposals for the CAP after 2013 […] 
aim to reduce the discrepancies between the levels of payments obtained after full implementation of the 
current legislation, between farmers, regions and Member States”. Besides growing public and political 
interest, there are also good reasons to analyse the effects of agricultural policy on income distribution in 
the agricultural sector from an economic point of view. For instance, Mishra et al. (2009) refer to links 
between farm income inequality and technology adaption, productivity, sectoral growth, and social issues 
such as family health. 
This interest is also reflected in the scientific literature. However, most of the literature regarding 
redistributive effects of agricultural policy is ex-post and static in nature. Several studies focus on the 
distribution of direct payments (e.g. Keeney, 2000; El Benni and Finger, 2013, Severini and Tantari, 
2013, 2015). Fewer authors also take effects of market price support into account and aim to assess 
redistributive effects of the whole system of agricultural support (e.g. Allanson, 2006; 2008; Moreddu, 
2011). Yet, despite the undoubted usefulness and importance of ex-post analyses, they are of limited use 
when it comes to the evaluation of distributional impacts of policies that do not currently exist, but that 
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might exist in the future. For such an exercise counterfactual situations have to be constructed, at best 
accounting for incentive effects and the behaviour of individuals (Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2003). 
Simulation models account for behavioural effects. But most macro or sectoral models apply 
representative groups rather than individual income units and the measurement of inequality is highly 
sensitive to the aggregation of individual data. Consider a population being divided into k mutually 
exclusive groups and Itotal representing an additively decomposable1 income inequality index of the form: 
Itotal = Iwithin + Ibetween with Iwithin representing a (weighted) sum of income inequality inside the k groups and 
Ibetween the inequality between subpopulation means (Deutsch and Silber, 1999). In the extreme case of 
just one representative group all the desired information would be hidden in Iwithin whereas only Ibetween 
would be measurable, but without any meaning in this case. Obviously, inequality inside of aggregated 
groups is not observable and thus, the loss of information generates a downward bias in the measurement 
of overall inequality by only incorporating grouped income data. Even the assumption of an exogenous 
constant degree of inequality within the groups and the application of group specific changes in average 
income to all group members is likely to produce biased results because there is no reason why within-
group income distribution should be unaffected by different scenario assumptions (Bourguignon et al., 
2005; Savard, 2005). The share of inequality that is accounted for by the between-groups component is 
expected to increase with the number of subgroups of a population, other factors being equal (Shorrocks 
and Wan, 2005).  
In other scientific areas, e.g. poverty analysis or tax reform analysis, it is quite common to conduct ex-
ante assessments of macroeconomic shocks on individual income distributions on a national level. To this 
end, methods were developed to commonly assess impacts of macroeconomic shocks on an aggregate and 
individual level by combining outputs of macro models with individual data, mostly large population or 
household surveys (e.g. Debowicz and Golan, 2013, Cororaton and Cockburn, 2007). 
Only a few similar tools for the measurement of impacts of sectoral or macroeconomic policies on the 
individual farm income level exist for the agricultural sector. Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney 
(2009), and Hertel et al. (2007), e.g. combine a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a large 
farm household survey to assess distributional effects of WTO negotiations on US agricultural 
households. Louhichi and Valin (2012) combine a CGE model with a programming model that depicts 
individual arable farms in France to estimate impacts of biofuel policies. 
Several other tools exist for ex-ante policy impact analyses in the agricultural sector, which depict farms 
at regional or farm type level but not at the individual level. The CAPRI model for example is applied to 
estimate farm type specific income effects of reforms of EU direct payments (Gocht et al., 2013). 
Deppermann et al. (2014) conduct an analysis of agricultural policy reform induced redistributive effects 
for the western German agricultural sector based on 467 farm groups. These attempts already apply quite 
disaggregated models. However, it is not clear how serious the grouping of individual data affects the 
results of an analysis of redistributive effects. 
Against this background the main objectives of this paper are (1) to analyse the distributional impacts of 
an abolishment of different CAP instruments with a tool that is able to consistently assess impacts of 
sectoral policy on individual farm incomes, (2) to derive conclusions regarding the policy implications of 
                                                          
1 The term ‘additively decomposable’ refers to the property of an inequality index, to be subgroup decomposable into 
exactly two terms: the between-groups inequality component which is gained by replacing all individual incomes by 
subgroup means and the within-group component, which is a weighted average of inequality within subgroups. The 
Gini coefficient e.g. is not additively decomposable in this sense (Deutsch and Silber, 1999).  
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the analysis, and (3) to get insights into the effects of grouping individual data with regard to the analysis 
of redistributive effects. 
 
2. Modelling chain 
2.1. Description of the overall model chain 
Measuring redistributive effects of agricultural policy reforms requires a simultaneous analysis of impacts 
at different levels of aggregation. Effects at the sectoral level need to be taken into account and at the 
same time information on individual production and income changes at the micro level is necessary to 
catch the full impact on income distribution. 
In this study, a modelling system consisting of three different single models depicting three different 
levels of aggregation is developed to consistently measure changes in individual incomes among western 
German farms resulting from agricultural policy reforms. Figure 1 presents a schematic overview of the 
model chain.  
 
Loop until
| ∆ Pi - ∆ Pi-1|< 0.01
∆ AREA (crops)
∆ Q (livestock)
(Germany)
LEGEND:
∆: % change 2020 to baseyear
P: Price vector
Q: Supply vector
AREA: Area vector
YIELD: Yield vector
i: Iteration step
∆ P (EU27)
∆ Yield
(Germany)
Agricultural Sector Model
ESIM
(EU27 member states in a global 
context)
Agricultural Supply Model
FARMIS
(628 farm groups representing the
German agricultural sector)
Farm Group Results (2020)
Micro-accounting Model
Analysis of redistributive effects
Single Farm Income
(Baseline, 2020)
Single Farm Income
(Scenarios, 2020)
 
Figure 1: Methodological framework for an ex-ante measurement of redistributive effects of 
agricultural policies on farm incomes 
Source: Own composition on the basis of Mussard and Savard (2010). 
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The model with the highest level of aggregation is an agricultural sector model depicting European 
agricultural markets in detail and the agricultural sector of rest of the world in a more aggregate manner. 
It is a partial model in the sense that it explicitly models the agricultural sector and takes all other sectors 
as exogenously given. Thus, core macroeconomic variables such as inflation rates and GDP growth rates 
are exogenous to the model. At the meso-level, a model which depicts the supply side of the German 
agricultural sector in great detail is applied to measure impacts of agricultural policy changes on 628 
heterogeneous farm groups. Both simulation models are two already pre-existing large scale models, the 
European Simulation Model (ESIM; Grethe, 2012) at the sectoral and the Farm Modelling Information 
System (FARMIS; Osterburg et al., 2001; Bertelsmeier, 2005; Offermann et al., 2005) at the farm group 
level. They both have been combined in previous studies to measure the impact of agricultural policy on 
income distribution, however, on the basis of farm groups rather than individual farm incomes 
(Deppermann et al., 2014). The models are coupled in an iterative way until they converge on exchanged 
variables in the analysis of a joint scenario (Deppermann et al., 2010). 
After convergence between ESIM and FARMIS is achieved, farm group results are passed in a top-down 
manner to a newly developed micro model to assess individual farm incomes for the year 2020, the final 
year of the simulation period. The micro model is an accounting model in the sense of Bourguignon et al. 
(2008), i.e. without own behavioural component. It further disaggregates the results of the farm groups 
commonly calculated by ESIM and FARMIS. The micro model serves as an add-on to the FARMIS 
model, since it relies on its structure. It is based on the German farm accountancy data network (FADN). 
With this modelling system, ex-ante evaluations of policy scenarios are conducted. Based on simulation 
results for the year 2020 income distribution indices are calculated. To evaluate the state of income 
inequality in the agricultural sector and the degree of progressivity of different reform packages, 
inequality indices of different policy scenarios are compared to a reference scenario. 
2.2. From the sectoral to the meso-level: an iterative approach 
The modelling system covering the sectoral and the meso-level is described in more detail in Deppermann 
et al. (2010). The linkage of the two models allows us to quantify adjustment processes both at the 
sectoral level and at the farm group level for the German agricultural sector. Below, the two models and 
their interface are briefly presented. 
ESIM (Grethe, 2012) is a comparative-static, net-trade, partial equilibrium model of the European 
agricultural sector. It depicts the EU-27 at the member state level with a strong focus on the CAP. In 
addition, ESIM also models the highly aggregated rest of the world. ESIM contains 31 regions and 47 
products as well as a high degree of detail for EU policy including specific and ad valorem tariffs, tariff 
rate quotas, intervention and threshold prices, export subsidies, coupled and decoupled direct payments, 
production quotas, and set-aside regulations. All behavioural functions (except for sugar supply) in ESIM 
are isoelastic. ESIM has a very detailed depiction of the complex system of substitution of land among 
different products and the relationship between ruminant production and agricultural area. The price 
formation mechanism in ESIM assumes an EU point market for all products except for non-tradables, for 
which the price results from a domestic supply and demand market clearing equilibrium at the EU 
member state level. 
FARMIS is a comparative-static process-analytical programming model for farm groups (Osterburg et al., 
2001; Bertelsmeier, 2005; Offermann et al., 2005). Production is differentiated for 27 crop and 15 
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livestock activities. The matrix restrictions cover the areas of feeding (energy and nutrient requirements, 
calibrated feed rations), intermediate use of young livestock, fertilizer use (organic and mineral), labour 
(seasonally differentiated), crop rotations and political instruments (e.g., set-aside and quotas). The model 
specification is based on information from the German farm accountancy data network, supplemented by 
data from farm management manuals. Data from three consecutive accounting years is averaged to reduce 
the influence of yearly variations common in agriculture (e.g., due to weather conditions) on model 
specification and income levels. Key characteristics of FARMIS are: 1) the use of aggregation factors that 
allow for representation of the sectors’ production and income indicators; 2) input-output coefficients 
which are consistent with information from farm accounts; and 3) the use of a positive mathematical 
programming procedure to calibrate the model to the observed base year levels. Prices are generally 
exogenous and are provided by market models. An exception to this applies to specific agricultural 
production factors, such as the milk quota, land, and young livestock, where (simplified) markets are 
modelled endogenously, allowing the derivation of respective equilibrium prices under different policy 
scenarios. FARMIS uses farm groups rather than single farms not only to ensure the confidentiality of 
individual farm data, but also to increase manageability and the robustness of the model system when 
dealing with data errors that may exist in individual cases. Homogenous farm groups are generated by the 
aggregation of single farm data. For this study, farms were stratified by region, type, and size, resulting in 
628 farm groups which represent the German agricultural sector, of which 467 are located in western 
Germany.  
ESIM and FARMIS were linked through the exchange of solution variables (vectors of price and yield 
changes from ESIM to FARMIS and vectors of quantity changes from FARMIS to ESIM) until both 
models converged on these variables in the analysis of joint scenarios. Convergence is defined to be 
reached when the difference in price and area (supply for livestock) changes less than 1% between two 
iteration steps. Before this final and rather mechanical procedure was pursued, considerable preparatory 
work was undertaken. Policy parameters and assumptions as well as a wide range of further parameters 
exogenous to both models were harmonized, including inflation rates, technical progress and changes of 
factor costs. Consistent product interfaces were defined and for a first stand-alone baseline scenario, 
vectors of price and yield changes were created by ESIM and implemented (as exogenous variables) into 
FARMIS. Afterwards, a detailed comparison and analysis of the reaction of both models to the same 
vector of price changes and subsequent model modifications concerning the area allocation for crops as 
well as the supply of livestock products were conducted. Finally, the iteration process was carried out and 
thus in effect, the German supply component in ESIM was replaced by FARMIS. 
The above described modelling system is calibrated to a base period (average of the years 2006-2008). 
The baseline (the reference scenario) and reform scenarios are conducted for the year 2020. Scenarios are 
evaluated in comparison to the baseline scenario and thus provide a comparative-static analysis of 
exogenous policy changes. 
2.3. From the meso to the micro-level: a top-down approach with micro accounting 
After ESIM and FARMIS converged in the first step of the modelling chain, detailed results regarding 
production patterns, factor demand and income sources for 628 farm groups are obtained representing the 
whole German agricultural sector. This information is further disaggregated by a microsimulation model 
which is integrated into the modelling system (Figure 1). In the following sections at first the choice of 
the methodology, the income variable under consideration, and the choice of the study area are explained 
before the model is introduced in detail. 
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FARMIS applies farm groups instead of individual farms due to better manageability and an increased 
robustness of the model. Especially potential data errors in individual cases could lead to high variations 
among the calculated input-output coefficients between farms and result in higher solution instability 
(Osterburg et al. 2001). Furthermore, the time needed to set up the model with an updated database 
(which would likely be longer with the implementation of individual farms) has to be taken into account. 
Aggregation however comes at a cost. Firstly, there is the possibility of aggregation bias, which occurs 
when the aggregated outcome of model solutions for individual farms differs from the model solution for 
the respective aggregated farm. For linear programming models, Day (1963) shows that exact aggregation 
can be obtained if aggregated farms exhibit technical, pecunious and institutional homogeneity. In 
practical applications, these requirements can hardly be fully met, but aggregation bias is usually reduced 
by clustering farms by criteria which are related to these requirements (like region, size, etc; Hazell and 
Norton, 1986). Secondly, the aggregation of farms can mask the heterogeneity of result indicators. For the 
measurement of inequality, which has not been a traditional field of analysis for the FARMIS model, the 
respective clustering criteria do not ensure homogeneity with respect to some of the variables important 
for the inequality analysis (e.g., information on ownership of used resources), and a certain part of 
inequality will be hidden inside the groups and thus not be observable. 
For this study it was decided that the two large scale models at the top of the modelling chain shall be 
kept exercisable as stand-alone models. This has the advantage that updated versions of the single models 
can easily be implemented in the modelling chain. This rather practical choice relates to the institutional 
challenge of sustainable maintenance of linked model systems, which is a matter of sufficient financial 
and/or human resources (Offermann, 2008). Hence, to make use of synergy effects in model development 
it was decided to run the FARMIS model based on farm groups and develop an add-on model that allows 
a further disaggregation of the grouped results instead of directly running FARMIS with individual farms. 
The microsimulation model itself can easily be switched to an updated model database. 
The indicator applied for the measurement of income inequality among farms in the German agricultural 
sector is family farm income (FFI). FFI provides information on the return to land, labour, and capital 
resources owned by the farm family, as well as the remuneration of entrepreneurial risk. Henceforth, the 
terms income and FFI will be used synonymously. Due to the dominance of corporate farms in eastern 
Germany all analyses presented in this study are restricted to 467 western German farm groups 
aggregated from 8034 individual farms, because no comparability between different farm structures could 
be ensured when using FFI as an indicator. 
For the base period both individual and grouped data can be observed and thus, the information on 
inequality which is lost due to data grouping and working with average values instead of micro data can 
be calculated. For the current base data of the modelling system, a comparison of the relative Gini 
coefficient reveals some differences in inequality for the base period: the relative Gini coefficient of 
single farm income data is 0.55 and the relative Gini coefficient of farm group income data is 0.40. 
The objective of the microsimulation model is the disaggregation of farm group results of the last year of 
the simulation period. Individual FFI data are generated by tracing back farm group results to the 
individual farms which were used for the generation of farm groups in the base year. The basic idea of the 
model is to calculate base year values of the shares each single production activity contributes to 
individual farm gross margin and resource requirements, and then adapt these proportionally according to 
respective farm group changes between the base year and 2020. This procedure is described in more 
detail in the following. 
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Grouping individual FADN data for utilization in the FARMIS model implies the calculation of average 
production quantities, factor costs, gross margins and income values as well as the generation of 
aggregation factors to represent the respective proportion of the total population for each farm group in 
the base period. These values are subsequently applied in the FARMIS model to run simulations. Gross 
margins for single production activities refer to market revenues plus subsidies less attributable 
production costs for a specific activity and are not directly apparent in FADN data2. However, since this 
information is crucial for running simulations with FARMIS, several assumptions and additional 
calculations are made to generate activity specific gross margins, when defining the farm group 
programming models (for details see Offermann at al., 2005 and Osterburg et al., 2001).  
Taking into account costs for resources not owned by the farm family, the income generated from 
considered agricultural activities is derived as: 
ni
Groups Groups Groups Groups Groups
n ni nj nj
i j
Income _ Agr p q c r n= × − × ∀∑ ∑     (1) 
with pni depicting the gross margins of commodity i for farm group n, qni the respective activity levels, 
cnj factor prices of land and labour and rnj the respective quantities of purchased factors. The index 
Groups is added to point out that the indicators refer to farm groups rather than individual farms. Since 
not all commodities, income sources and costs indicated in the German FADN are also allocated to 
activities and included in FARMIS (e.g., forestry and agri-tourism are not explicitly covered in the 
model), a part of the original FFI is not accounted for by the model and is assumed to remain fixed at base 
year values. This fixed income component is derived as the difference between observed FFI and 
calculated income from agriculture as: 
Groups Groups Groups
n n nIncome _ Fix FFI Income _ Agr= −       (2) 
In a next step, base year income from agriculture of individual farms is calculated. To this end farm 
individual activity levels from FADN data are combined with respective average gross margins which 
were calculated for FARMIS groups, thus reflecting the shares that single production activities contribute 
to the individual farm income. This is indicated in equation (3) by differentiation between individual 
farms (indiv) and the Groups individual farms k are assigned to. Furthermore, individual costs for hired 
labour and rented land are as well separately calculated by utilizing average group prices and individual 
input quantities. The latter depend on farm specific activity levels q and factor endowments b, 
indiv Groups indiv Groups Group indiv indiv
k ki ki kj ij ki kj
i j
Income _ Agr p q c ( A q b ) k= × − × − ∀∑ ∑   (3) 
where Aij is the matrix of resource requirements of the production activities. 
Similar to the approach at group level, the part of income not covered by the model is derived as the 
difference between observed FFI and calculated income from agriculture as: 
indiv indiv indiv
k k kIncome _ Fix FFI Income _ Agr= − .        (4) 
By running the ESIM-FARMIS modelling chain, farm group results for the year 2020 are generated. The 
generated changes of activity levels between the base year and the year 2020 are applied to individual 
base year levels. That is, all individual farms covered by a specific farm group have the same percentage 
                                                          
2 For example, variable input costs are not directly attributed to production activities in the German FADN. 
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changes in production. The quantity of rented land is calculated according to new farm specific crop 
activity levels less the farm owned share of land. Labour requirements are calculated regarding new 
production quantities, and hired labour costs are derived taking into account individual farm resources of 
family workers. Adjusted activity levels and resource requirements then are multiplied by respective 
gross margins and factor prices for the year 2020. This is depicted in equation (5) by differentiation 
between indicators referring to the base year (base) and to 2020. 
2020
2020 2020 2020 2020
Groups ,
indiv , Groups , indiv ,base Groups , Groups indiv , indivki
k ki ki kj ij ki kjGroups ,base
i jki
indiv
k
qFFI p q c ( A q b )
q
Income _ Fix k.
= × × − × −
+ ∀
∑ ∑   (5) 
The fixed income component is then added to the income from agriculture.  
The micro-model is of the micro accounting type in the sense of Bourguignon et al. (2008) since the 
model is static which means there is no behaviour depicted in the model itself. A similar approach for the 
generation of farm incomes at the micro level is used in the FES model (Woltjer et al., 2011) which 
applies exogenous price changes to static single farms. 
Our approach still relies on the assumption that all farmers in one group react in the same proportional 
way when adapting their production patterns to new price incentives. However, heterogeneity among 
production patterns of farms in the same group is taken into consideration because different commodities 
might face different price changes. The application of 467 behavioural farm groups which, on average, 
aggregate just 17 farms also distinguishes the modelling chain from a similar methodology presented in 
Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et al. (2007), which, in a nutshell, maps 
quantities and prices resulting from only one regional household of a CGE model to a disaggregated farm 
household survey. 
However, one caveat remains. The overall farm population of western Germany represented by the 
national FADN consist of 200,000 farms in the base year. This in turn means that 8,024 FADN farms still 
account for only a fraction of all farms and have to be weighted by an aggregation factor to represent their 
respective proportion of the overall population. Thus, an implicit assumption is that one single farm 
depicted in the modelling system (or in the FADN data) on average represents 25 farms of the overall 
population in the base year.  
Summing up, the model accounts for heterogeneity of farms inside a group to allow for measuring 
changes in inside-group inequality. Results are disaggregated in a static, top-down manner, after the 
ESIM-FARMIS model chain is solved. In principle, the approach is comparable to other standard micro 
accounting approaches utilizing representative groups. However, this analysis refers to 467 representative 
farm groups from a behavioural model, which in comparison is an outstandingly high number. 
3. Measurement of redistributive effects 
For the evaluation of redistributive impacts a methodology is utilized which originally was developed for 
the analysis of traditional redistributive policies such as tax policies (Kakwani, 1986) and has been 
applied for the assessment of redistributive effects of agricultural policy in several studies (e.g. Allanson, 
2006, 2008, Deppermann et al., 2014). Following Kakwani’s (1986) methodology, the overall effect of 
redistribution of agricultural policy reforms R can be measured as the difference between the relative Gini 
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index3 of the baseline scenario in 2020 (Gx) and the relative Gini index of the liberalisation scenario in 
2020 (Gy) and can be split up into a vertical component V and a re-ranking component H: 
( ) ( )x y x y y yR G G G C C G V H= − = − + − = + .        (6) 
The index of vertical redistribution V equals the difference between the relative Gini index of the baseline 
situation and the relative concentration index of the liberalisation scenario Cy. The latter measures 
relative inequality among individual incomes after liberalisation while keeping constant the ranks which 
individuals had in the income parade of the baseline scenario.4 Thus, if all farms keep their baseline ranks 
after liberalisation Cy and Gy will coincide. The vertical component is determined by the state of 
progressivity of burden P and the share of average burden in average baseline income s and can also be 
expressed as V = Gx – Cy = P(s/(1-s)). Progressivity is measured by the Kakwani (1977) measure of 
progressivity P = CB - Gx, with CB being the concentration index of burden which depicts the distribution 
of the burden ranked by baseline income. Thus, P indicates to which extent a burden (i.e. income losses 
due to liberalisation) is distributed more unequally or equally than income in the baseline scenario 
(Aronson et al., 1994). 
However, when farms change their ranks due to liberalisation the new state of inequality will be 
overestimated if only vertical effects are taken into consideration (Lambert, 2001). The vertical index 
treats high-income farms as high-income farms and low-income farms as low-income farms, even though 
they might have changed ranks due to liberalisation, i.e. farms with former high ranks in the income 
parade hold low ranks after liberalisation and vice versa. These re-ranking effects are identified by the 
index H, which is also known as the Atkinson-Plotnik-index of re-ranking (Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 
1981). 
So far, the measurement of redistributive effects was discussed with regard to relative inequality. Relative 
inequality indices are scale invariant, i.e. proportional changes in all incomes do not affect the degree of 
inequality. To additionally reflect another normative view of inequality equivalence, the analysis also is 
conducted based on absolute Gini and concentration indices which are invariant to equal absolute changes 
in all incomes. Absolute Gini and concentration indices can be obtained by multiplication of the relative 
indices by average sample incomes. In absolute terms the overall effect of redistribution can be 
decomposed in a similar way like the relative index above (Allanson, 2008): 
( ) ( )x y x x y y x x y y y y y yAR AG AG μ G μ G μ G μ C μ C μ G AV AH= − = − = − + − = +       (7) 
where A indicates the absolute versions of the respective indices and μx and μy represent the average 
income of the baseline and the scenario results, respectively. Since an equal absolute burden would be 
assessed as distribution neutral it is the benchmark for the measurement of progressivity in absolute 
terms. Thus, the (relative) concentration index of burden (CB) indicates whether a burden is progressively 
or regressively distributed since it is negative (positive) when small incomes have to bear a greater 
(smaller) part of the burden than higher incomes. 
                                                          
3 The relative Gini index (G) can (in discrete form) be specified as: 2 1 1
1
2
n n
i j
i j
G ( y y ) /
n
µ
= =
= −∑∑
 with yi representing 
the income of individual i (i = 1, 2, 3,…, n) and μ average income (e.g. Pyatt, 1976).  
4 The corresponding Lorenz curve of a Gini index plots cumulative shares of one variable against cumulative shares 
of units of observation which are ranked in ascending order with regard to the same variable. Respectively, the 
corresponding concentration curve of a concentration index plots cumulative shares of one variable against 
cumulative shares of units of observation which are ranked according to another variable (Lambert, 2001).  
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The absolute and relative analyses may lead to oppositional results. For the same scenario a burden may 
be assessed as progressive in absolute terms (indicated by a positive CB) but as regressive in relative 
terms (indicated by a negative P if CB < Gx) due to different benchmarks of distributional neutrality 
(Allanson and Petrie, 2012). 
Liberalising the agricultural sector has clear negative impacts on average farm income in the presented 
scenarios with considerable shares of the sample having negative incomes after liberalisation. The 
appearance of negative incomes in general is unproblematic for the absolute Gini. However, even though 
the relative Gini coefficient is well defined for negative incomes as well (Amiel et al, 1996; Cowell, 
2009), some difficulties may arise in interpretation of its results, e.g. it is argued that inequality may be 
overestimated in such a case (Chen et al, 1982). Recalling that average distances among individual 
incomes appear in the numerator of the relative Gini and mean income in the denominator (footnote 3, it 
becomes clear that the relative Gini increases exponentially with decreasing mean income, assuming that 
absolute distances between income units do not change. This is true also when negative incomes are 
excluded. However, the appearance of negative incomes makes this effect more pronounced because it 
increases the spread between numerator and denominator without having a ‘natural bound’: absolute 
average distances can be kept constant and at the same time mean income can become close to zero5. 
Therefore, the relative Gini is no longer bound to the maximum value of one. Vice versa, with the 
allowance for negative incomes absolute average distances can increase without a ‘natural bound’ while 
keeping mean income constant. If this happens with an already comparatively low mean income, changes 
in absolute distances may seem disproportionally strong in relative terms.  
4. Scenarios 
With the above described modelling system, scenarios are conducted for the year 2020 with the model 
base period being an average of the years 2006-2008. Three different liberalisation scenarios are 
compared with a reference scenario (the baseline) regarding their income distribution. In the baseline, the 
2003 Reform and the Health Check of the CAP are fully implemented except for the abolishment of milk 
quotas. Milk quotas are assumed to increase until 2015 according to the Agenda 2000 decision, including 
the additional 2% quota increase in 2008 and the fat adjustment in 2009/10. It is assumed that a (first 
generation) biofuel share of 8% in total EU transport fuel consumption will be reached by 2020. 
Furthermore, the sugar market reform decided upon in 2005 is implemented and set-aside obligations are 
removed in 2008. The baseline adopts constant levels of tariffs, export subsidies, tariff rate quotas (except 
for sugar), and the current system of intervention prices. For the international environment, ESIM is 
calibrated to FAPRI world market price projections (FAPRI, 2011) and no changes in external trade 
policies of the EU are assumed until 2020. 
To account for the effects of liberalising agricultural policy on income in the agricultural sector, the 
baseline results in 2020 are compared with results of other scenarios in 2020. The single scenario results 
reflect impacts of different, exogenously defined policy changes on the income distribution compared to 
the baseline scenario. The strongest liberalisation scenario assumes a full market liberalisation of EU 
agricultural policies (i.e., the abolishment of all intervention prices, tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and direct 
payments). Therefore, in 2020 the EU price level equals the world market price for tradable products. In 
another scenario isolated effects of a separate abolishment of direct payments (DP) are analysed 
                                                          
5 Of course mean income can become negative as well, which would result in a negative value for the relative Gini. 
However, we abstract from this possibility here since the discussion of negative Ginis is beyond the scope of this 
paper and not relevant in the empirical analysis. 
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(henceforth, No_DP scenario) and in another scenario all price policies are abolished (henceforth, 
No_Pricepol scenario), but direct payments are still paid to farmers to single out the effects of different 
policy instruments. 
 
 
5. Results  
In this chapter distributional effects of different scenarios are presented. Results are calculated based on 
8034 individual farm data on the one hand and on 467 FARMIS groups on the other hand to evaluate the 
aggregation error which appears when distributional impacts are accounted for by the application of 
grouped data. 
General inequality effects will at first be discussed on the basis of individual data, followed by 
comparison to results based on grouped data and discussion of emerging differences. 
In the No_DP scenario income is reduced by 8,953€ on average, which accounts for 19.7% of income in 
the baseline scenario (Table 1)6. This comparatively moderate effect7 partly is due to the high rate of 
capitalisation of DPs in land prices assumed in FARMIS and the high share of rented land in western 
Germany (68%, on average, in the baseline scenario in 20208). 
In absolute terms the DP cut leads to a slightly more equal situation. Little re-ranking effects occur and 
the overall redistributive effect also is small, which is due to the moderate average support reduction and 
due to a comparatively low level of progressivity of income losses. Yet, the CB measure indicates that 
support reduction is progressively distributed which means that higher incomes bear a higher burden of an 
abolishment of DPs than smaller incomes do. In tendency, absolute losses increase with the income 
levels. The relative analysis reveals an opposite inequality effect: Inequality in relative terms increases 
after the abolishment of DPs and the negative index of progressivity P indicates a regressive distribution 
of losses. This means that relative to baseline results, lower income farms tend to lose larger shares of 
their incomes than farms with higher incomes. 
In the No_Pricepol scenario (Table 1, Section III) income cuts are more pronounced compared to the 
No_DP scenario. On the one hand, losses in the No_DP scenario are low because of the capitalisation 
effects in the land market and on the other hand, losses are high in the No_Pricepol scenario, mostly due 
to the abolishment of high tariffs and export subsidies in the livestock sector. Furthermore, the milk and 
sugar markets are heavily affected due to the removal of quota restrictions and relatively high border 
protection. Thus, income on average is reduced by 48% when price policies are abolished. However, such 
results should be interpreted against the background that with this strong reduction in average income, 
significant structural change such as an increase in farm size and farmers leaving the sector can be 
expected which is not depicted in current model specifications. 
                                                          
6 Results presented in this paper slightly differ from those presented in Deppermann et al. (2014) for the analysis 
based on grouped data due to some minor changes undertaken in the modeling system. However, variations are very 
small and do not affect any conclusion drawn from the analysis. 
7 Average losses of DPs account for 18,331€. 
8 It shall be noted that in the FADN very small farms with less than 16 European Size Units are excluded for the 
years of our model base period. Thus, the share of rented land in the farms covered by the models is a bit higher than 
for all farms, since very small farms usually operate with a higher share of own land. 
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In absolute terms, the No_Pricepol scenario clearly leads to a positive overall effect of redistribution. 
Similar to the No_DP scenario, higher income farms tend to bear higher absolute losses than lower 
income farms. The higher CB index indicates that the distribution of losses is even more unfavourable for 
higher income farms than in the No_DP scenario. In relative terms, income inequality increases compared 
to baseline values. However, almost half of the overall effect originates from re-ranking effects. The 
index of progressivity is clearly negative, which indicates that lower income farms bear a larger share of 
the overall burden than their share in baseline income. 
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Table 1: Decomposition of changes in income inequality (individual data vs. grouped data) 
  Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
  Individual data Grouped Data Individual data Grouped Data 
I) Baseline Results      
Average income (in €)  45,424 
Gini index of income (A) Gx 
0.560 0.422 25,443 19,164 
      
II) No_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  36,470 
Average support reduction (in €)  8,953 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) S 0.197 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.662 0.487 24,155 17,775 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.649 0.480 23,662 17,496 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.102 -0.065 1,288 1,389 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.014 -0.008 -493 -279 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.089 -0.058 1,781 1,668 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.361 -0.236 0.199 0.186 
      
III) No_Pricepol scenario   
Average income (in €)  23,823 
Average support reduction (in €)  21,601 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) S 0.476 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.782 0.498 18,632 11,857 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.683 0.434 16,265 10,349 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.222 -0.076 6,811 7,308 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.099 -0.063 -2,367 -1,508 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.123 -0.013 9,178 8,815 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.135 -0.014 0.425 0.408 
      
IV) Full_Lib scenario   
Average income (in €)  14,046 
Average support reduction (in €)  31,378 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) S 0.691 
Gini index  (A) Gy 1.256 0.739 17,642 10,377 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 1.005 0.582 14,111 8,179 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.696 -0.317 7,801 8,787 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.251 -0.156 -3,531 -2,198 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.445 -0.160 11,331 10,985 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.199 -0.072 0.361 0.350 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The Full_Lib scenario represents a combination of the No_DP and No_Pricepol scenarios. Since effects 
go into the same direction in both single scenarios, redistributive effects are more pronounced in the 
Full_Lib scenario and the state of progressivity is intermediate. The more than proportionally strong 
reaction of R in the relative analysis partly goes back to a high share of negative incomes in the income 
distribution. 
Comparing the analysis which is based on individual data and the one which is based on FARMIS groups 
it can be observed that single indicators clearly differ in terms of magnitude (Table 1). However, the 
direction of inequality effects and the evaluation of policy reforms are similar. 
It is intuitive that both, absolute and relative Gini indices are larger when calculated on the basis of 
individual data since within-group inequality is additionally included in the analysis. For baseline results 
between-groups inequality accounts for 75% of total inequality measured on individual basis while for the 
Full_Lib scenario between-groups inequality only covers 59% of total inequality. 
As the farm groups are not organized according to FFI, but according to farm type, region, and size the 
ranking of incomes in the individual approach is different from ranking individuals due to the average 
incomes of their groups, which is implicitly the ranking in the grouped data approach. After the 
disaggregation of grouped results, some farms with low or high incomes formerly belonging to middle 
class income groups therefore move to the fringe of the overall distribution while contrarily high (low) 
income farms of low (high) income groups surge to the middle of the distribution. As a result of this re-
ranking, average income in the baseline is 3% lower in the lowest decile group and 7% higher in the top 
decile group when individual rankings are considered. 
In each scenario the overall redistributive effect is more unequalizing in case of the relative Gini and less 
equalizing in absolute terms when calculated on the basis of individual data. The vertical effect in 
absolute terms is more equalizing for all scenarios. This reflects the higher degree of progressivity (CB) 
which appears because in the disaggregated version farms in the top decile have a higher income, on 
average, compared to the grouped data approach and tend to lose higher absolute amounts of income due 
to liberalisation. But then more equalizing vertical effects in the disaggregated approach are 
overcompensated by also higher re-ranking effects. In relative terms both, V and H are more negative in 
all scenarios. 
However, redistributive effects differ only slightly in the absolute analysis. Especially the CB indices, 
which also determine the absolute vertical effects, are close between the approaches. For the relative 
analysis differences are higher between the two approaches. This is comprehensible given the similar 
degree of distribution of absolute losses after disaggregation because for the calculation of relative 
progressivity it is compared with the higher degree of inequality in baseline incomes (P = CB – Gx). 
Concluding, after the disaggregation of groups inequality increases and individual farms change their 
ranks to a certain extent compared to the implicit ranking of the grouped data approach. However, the 
distribution of absolute income losses with respect to baseline rankings (CB) is already well anticipated, 
on average, by the grouped data approach. This in turn leads to more regressive income changes in 
relative terms when individual data are applied mainly because the benchmark (the initial degree of 
inequality Gx) has changed. 
The most remarkable difference occurs among the relative index of progressivity in the No_Pricepol 
scenario. It is remarkable not because of the scope of the difference but because of the qualitative 
interpretation. The analysis of between-groups inequality suggests an almost neutral distribution of 
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income reductions in relative terms. Contrarily, the analysis of individual data shows a clear negative 
index which implies regressively distributed income losses. 
However, large differences in the relative analysis, especially between the overall redistributive effects, 
should be interpreted with caution due to a high share of negative incomes in the analysis (26% of groups 
in Full_Lib have negative income and 36% of individuals in the same scenario; for the baseline the ratio 
is 5% to 13%). Even though the relative Gini is well defined in such cases, the difference between the 
relative Gini index of the baseline and the relative Gini of the scenarios (i.e. R) may suggest a strong 
disparity between the approaches which might as such not appear without the appearance of negative 
incomes since the relative Gini reacts more sensitive to the same changes in absolute distances (i.e. the 
numerator of the relative Gini) with lower mean incomes. 
In Figure 2 relative Lorenz curves are presented for individual data of the baseline and all scenarios to 
illustrate the impact of negative values and at the same time demonstrate that the Gini based inequality 
analysis in Table 1 ranks distributions appropriately. 
Figure 2: Relative Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios 
  
 Source: Own calculations. 
In comparison, two other studies conducting a similar approach to account for the impacts of grouping 
denote much stronger impacts on the qualitative results. Bourguignon et al. (2005) combine a standard 
multisector CGE model with a behavioural micro-simulation model to account for changes in real income 
under different real devaluation scenarios for Indonesia. They contrast resulting inequality changes based 
on ten groups with constant within-group inequality with results based on disaggregated incomes of 9,800 
individual households. Their results indicate substantial differences between the two methodologies and 
they found sign reversing effects due to the disaggregation. In a similar study Savard (2005) compares 
results based on seven representative household groups of a CGE model with results based on 
additionally disaggregated incomes for 39,520 households generated by a combination of a CGE and a 
microsimulation model. For a trade liberalisation scenario for the Philippines he finds that the two 
approaches systematically produce inverse results in the analysis of inequality effects at the national level 
(Savard, 2005). However, the two cited studies differ from the work at hand as they apply behavioural 
micro-models instead of accounting models for further disaggregation of the results but also much fewer 
and larger representative household groups in the aggregated model. Thus, the aggregation bias in the 
aggregated analysis probably is much more serious than in the analysis based on 467 farm groups 
including only 17 individual farms on average. Furthermore, they assume the observed distribution of 
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incomes inside the representative groups to be constant, whereas in our study within-group inequality is 
assumed to be constantly zero for the group based analysis since we want to evaluate the performance of 
agricultural sector models in the analysis of redistributive effects which are already highly disaggregated 
but still do not operate at the single farm level. 
6. Conclusions 
Since the CAP has increasingly been justified in recent decades by contributing to farm income stability, 
it is important to evaluate redistributive effects resulting from this policy, with obvious policy relevance. 
In this paper, different CAP liberalization scenarios are analysed with respect to inequality impacts in the 
agricultural sector. A tool is developed for this purpose that is able to consistently assess impacts of 
agricultural sector policy on individual farm incomes in western Germany.  
The results of this paper indicate that an abolishment of the main components of the CAP, direct 
payments and market and price policies, increases income inequality in the western German agricultural 
sector for all scenarios in relative terms but decreases inequality in absolute terms. On the one hand, 
increasing relative inequality implies that low-income farms tend to lose a higher share of their income 
compared to high-income farms when CAP instruments are abolished. On the other hand, however, a 
decreasing absolute inequality implies that high-income farms lose higher absolute amounts of income 
than small-income farms when the CAP is abolished. We conclude that if the CAP aims at a more equal 
income distribution within the agricultural sector, then significant scope for improving the design of 
respective policy instruments exists. Ideally the allocation of agricultural support should then be tied to 
income indicators instead of the current support criteria "production quantities" (for market price policies) 
or "land" (for DPs). This being said, there are good arguments that any sectoral agricultural income policy 
should not be attributed to the EU-level, but to the Member States of the EU (Grethe, 2008), and the CAP 
should instead solely focus on the provision of public goods such as environmental externalities or animal 
welfare (WBA, 2005), a discussion which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Comparing the inequality analysis based on individual data with an analysis of grouped data reveals that 
the level of inequality may be seriously underestimated when only taking grouped data into account. 
Redistributive effects from scenario analysis differ slightly in absolute terms and more in relative terms. 
Yet, the differences in the relative analysis should be interpreted with caution due to the appearance of 
negative incomes in the sample. In none of the scenarios does the use of individual instead of grouped 
data lead to sign inversion of any of the inequality indicators. 
A caveat of our methodology clearly is that the micromodel which disaggregates farm groups is static and 
relies on the behavioural changes of the groups of the meso-model, which are mapped accordingly. 
Nevertheless, heterogeneity among production patterns of farms in the same group is taken into 
consideration because different production patterns and factor endowments of individual farms are 
accounted for. Furthermore, with an average group aggregating just 17 FADN farms and stratification 
undertaken according to type, region, and size, the assumption of similar behaviour of individual farms 
belonging to the same group seems defendable. In general, the tool enables a substantially more specific 
analysis of inequality effects compared to an analysis of grouped data. 
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